This paper examines the effectiveness of the EU's use of trade to inducing peace in Libya during Gaddafi's final ten years in power, between 2001 and 2011. During this period, the EU implored and reiterated through rhetoric, policy and the exchange of goods and services that trade was to be used as a tool to maintain peace and prevent conflict. However, this paper identifies how this EU policy flopped, specifically due to the policy's failure to take into account the Libyan context, specifically: the Middle Eastern state's ethnographic and historical makeup, WMD program induced sanctions, Gaddafi's rule and the 2011 conflict, each of which amalgamated to ongoing conflict in Libya during Gaddafi's final decade in power.
Introduction
Since its foundation in 1951, the European Union (EU) has believed that economic integration leads to peace. This ethos, declared by the French Foreign Minister and one of the founding fathers of the EU, Robert Schuman on May 9, 1950 is based on the notion that the pooling and free flow of resources eliminates the potential for conflict. 1 This peacethrough-trade idea was initially concerned with inter-EU member state ties and was then extrapolated to include extra-EU member state relations. 2 In practice however, this policy has not always been successful. In order to assess this EU peace-through-trade-policy, this During the timeframe concerned, the EU implemented the 2004 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which aimed to improve political and economic relations with Mediterranean states, including Libya. 4 Additionally, EU-Libyan ties were under the remit of the 1995-08
Barcelona Process, which further emphasized the benefits of economic integration between the EU and its neighbors. 5 Then in 2008, the Barcelona Process developed into the 3 European-Mediterranean Agreement (EUROMED), 6 with Libya being an 'observer' of this framework, 7 referred to as the 1995/2008 EUROMED henceforth. Further, the 1993 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 8 was consolidated into the 2010 European External Action Service (EEAS), which also promoted the EU's peace-through-trade-policy towards foreign actors. 9 Libya also signed the 2008 EU-Libyan Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) during this timeframe. 10 Further, amidst the 2008 global recession, Libya refreshed the MoU and the 2010 Migration Cooperation Agenda (MCA). 11 In 2011, the protests and Libyan conflict which led to the death of Gaddafi, 12 resulted in a fall in EU-Libyan trade with Libyan imports hitting $2.91 billion (the lowest level since 2001) and exports dipping to $14.54 (the lowest since 2003). 13 Specifically, this study examines how the EU was unable to account for the environment in It is important to note that US policy towards Libya also impacted the EU's peace-through-trade-policy in this case. As a result, the US role and its impact on the EU's policy is highlighted throughout this paper.
For the purpose of this study, trade is measured by analyzing recorded EU-Libyan import and export levels in this period. 14 It is worth noting that these figures are published by the EU as an aggregation of European member state-Libyan trade levels. This indicates that this trade was carried out on a country-country (EU member-Libya) basis as opposed to a unioncountry (EU-Libya) basis. Therefore, EU member interests are what drove these trade transactions with Libya. Further, one of the main criticisms of the EU's inability to adopt a coherent foreign policy in this period was the internal rivalries between member states and EU institutional (European Parliament, European Council and European Commission) 4 interests. However, the focus of this paper is to identify why recorded EU-Libyan trade was unable to prevent conflict in Libya. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, the aggregated EU member trade levels with Libya (2001-11) represented the EU-Libyan trade relationship.
Finally, this paper assesses the competence of the EU's peace-through-trade-policy.
Therefore, its definition of peace is taken from the EU's policy itself. Specifically, the EU identifies that peace will ensue once barriers preventing its realization are removed. This includes non-proliferation of WMDs, 15 support for terrorist groups, 16 political and public freedom of expression and assembly and an end to civil conflict. 17 This paper defines Libya in a state of peace when the listed EU barriers are removed. It follows that if the EU was able to alleviate these peace concerns through trade, then it would have achieved peace in Libya. As a result, this study identifies the reasons for this policy failure and provides points to consider in order to facilitate peace-through-trade-policy success in the future. Namely the need to consider the political environment in which it is operating. The theoretical foundations of the trade-peace relationship are explored in the following section.
Peace-Through-Trade Literature
Before addressing the debate between trade and peace, it is important to define the key terms. Rather unambiguously, 'trade' is defined as the exchange of goods and services, and this study focuses on public and private sector 2001-11 EU-Libyan trade. The term 'peace' on the other hand requires more clarification.
As noted in the introduction, this work uses the EU policy's definition, i.e. the removal of barriers to peace, to test the peace-through-trade-policy. This definition is grounded in literature in the field. Notably, Hobbes determined that in order for two actors to be at peace they must act 'towards each other as they would allow for against themselves'. 18 Galtung also noted that in order for a country to be in a state of peace, there must be an agreement to do so. 19 That being said, it is possible for conflict to take place when peace agreements are active. Further, Bercovitch and Jackson define conflict as 'a perception of incompatibility between two or more actors and the range of behavior associated with such perceptions'. 20 
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The 'perceptions' here are very broad by nature and it is therefore necessary to focus this definition. By adapting and refining these definitions, this study operates under the assumption that Libya is in a state of peace/not in a state of conflict if it is pursuing the EU's stated strategies which prevent peace, including being involved in civil conflict.
Broadly speaking, there are two main sides to the peace-through-trade literature debate, one which asserts that the two variables are positively correlated and the other posits the opposite. 21 The former is generally considered to be operating under the liberal positive-sum assumption, which attributes a positive outcome to increased state interaction (in the form of trade in this case). Whilst the latter operates under the realist zero-sum rule, concerned with the conservative nature of inter-state trade and fosters an environment of competition between the actors involved so that they can maximize their trade surplus with one another. 22 Specifically, these theoretical standpoints operate under a different set of assumptions as to how the mechanisms of the trade-peace relationship operate. As Barbieri and Schneider note, from the liberal positive-sum perspective, the 'increased contact associated with greater trade ties promotes peace and unifies states'. 23 This is borne out of the assumption put forward by Smith that when two actors trade with one another, they benefit from mutual 'enrichment'. 24 Therefore, the EU is concerned with this 'increased contact' through trade, which in turn leads to mutual benefits, in the form of peace in this instance.
Conversely, the realist zero-sum approach as summarized by Schneider, Barbieri and On the other side of the debate, scholars have purported a negative correlation between trade and peace. 32 For example, Reuveny argued that the asymmetry of trade between
Israel and Palestine warrant the need for economic separation (which extends to limiting trade). 33 However, Reuveny does not take into account the fact that historical grievances between Israel and Palestine are deeply entrenched in this case. As a result, an economic policy designed to ameliorate conflict between the two actors must overcome the historical contextual barriers when considering the link between trade and peace. Similarly Barbieri comes to the same conclusion using the COW database. The issue once more with Barbieri's measure for peace is not only that it records instances of conflict, such as threats, 7 displays and use of military force, 34 but it fails to take into account non-military force which may lead to conflict. Therefore it is necessary to account for the context as well as the type of conflict when determining the peace-through-trade correlation of a given case.
On the issue of regime types, Gasiorowski and Polachek's study, in the context of East-West ties during the Cold War, found that increased trade and interdependence had a positive impact on ameliorating conflict. 35 Additionally, Barbieri's work identifies that the proponents of the peace-through-trade policy contend that trade is 'a means to overcome regime, cultural, and other national divisions'. 36 The remit of this paper is such that whilst it is implicitly concerned with this 'regime type' aspect of the trade-peace literature, it is primarily focused on the impact of trade on peace, no matter what the circumstance (see the EU's peace-through-trade-policy for detail). Therefore, its conclusions are solely focused on the trade-peace element in the literature, in the hope that future studies will center their attention on the 'regime type' aspect.
In order to overcome these issues, this study combines a qualitative analysis (of the political developments which took place in the period concerned) whilst incorporating quantitative data (i.e. EU-Libyan trade levels). As a result, the argument integrates the context into its analysis by examining the political and economic developments which prevented EU trade from leading to peace in 2001-11 Libya.
The EU's Peace-through-trade-policy
The EU's belief in the peace-through-trade relationship is fundamental to its foundation.
Indeed, Schuman's 1950 declaration was made with reference to Franco-German competition over coal and steel, something he identified as being a source of conflict between the two powers. 37 This vision was born under the EU's 1951 Paris Treaty, which:
Resolved to substitute for age-old rivals [France and Germany] the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and 8 deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforth shared. 38 This idea of a shared destiny progressed under the 1957 Rome Treaty when member states were instructed to work together to maintain international peace and security. 39 40 This idea of a common conviction to establish a united foreign policy to preserve peace remained in place until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the CFSP to establish 'systemic cooperation between member states in the conduct of policy', under the EU provisions, which include the principle of economic integration. 41 The CFSP was then consolidated under the EEAS in 2010 to ensure that member states were consistent in their external action. 42 The EU also had two instruments running alongside its foreign policy mechanism which concerned Libya, the 1995/2008 EUROMED and the 2004 ENP. Both of which implored the use of trade to preserve peace. 43 However, the fact that Libya was not fully integrated into the ENP 44 or the EUROMED, 45 meant that the EU's peace-through-trade-policy was unable to reach its goal in the context of these two instruments.
It is also important to clarify that the EU's peace-through-trade-policy was adopted in this case, in spite of pressure from other actors, i.e. the US (as detailed in this paper).
Additionally, the EU's policy is adopted no matter what the context is, i.e. whether a country is involved in conflict or the type of regime it is dealing with. A useful comparative example of this is the case of EU-Israeli ties where the EU's peace-through-trade-policy was systematically adopted when interacting with Israel. Specifically, during the 2008-09 9 Operation Cast Lead Conflict, an estimated 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis were killed, 46 demonstrating, among other developments, the lack of peace in this case. Additionally, whilst the conflict led to the upgrading of EU-Israeli ties being put on hold, 47 
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Association Agreement between the two actors remained in place. This agreement reasserted the EU's intentions of promoting peace, security and cohesion in the region and repeated the EU's dedication to the peace-through-trade-policy. 48 This not only demonstrates the EU's dedication to the policy but also its failure to take into account the context in which it is being implemented.
In other words, the EU's peace-through-trade-policy aims to achieve its goal with a trade partner, regardless of; the influence of other actors in the country in question, whether the country in question is in a state of peace or the type of regime it is dealing with. As a result, this demonstrates the EU's almost blind dedication to the peace-through-trade-policy.
The Libyan Context
The main argument of this paper is that the EU's peace-through-trade-policy failed in the case of 2001-11 Libya, due to the policy not taking into account the context in which it was implemented. This section underlines these contextual elements which prevented the EU policy from being successful.
Understanding the ethnographic makeup of Libya is key to identifying why the EU's peacethrough-trade-policy failed between 2001 and 2011, and why it caused continuing bouts of conflict and barriers to peace. The territory which is recognized as present day Libya is made up of the three former Ottoman provinces; Cyrenaica in the east, Tripolitania in the north-west and Fezzan in the south-west. 49 Vandewalle notes how the aggregation of these provinces led to a sense of statelessness in the country as an affinity to 'an earlier form of political community -family and tribe' still resonates in modern day Libya. 50 Libyan expedition and denoted that there was a 'good' chance of discovering commercial quantities of oil in the country. 54 At this point, the majority of discovered oil was located in the Sirte Basin, straddling the Tripolitania and Cyrenaica provinces. 55 The discovery of oil drastically changed the economic and political landscape of the country. Indeed, under King
Idris oil production jumped from 20,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1960 to 3 million bpd (mbpd) in 1969. 56 As a result, the wealth accrued from the resource and its distribution began to determine the power brokers in Libya.
The oil exploration was carried out under the 1955 Petroleum Law, which assured private oil companies that tenders for discovery and extraction would be based on commercial and not political considerations. 57 The law provided a basis for oil companies (particularly those in Europe which benefitted from limited transport costs compared to energy imports from the Gulf), to profit from the process whilst limiting the Libyan government to the role of tax collector. 58 As a result, the energy industry was protected and run by technocrats who ensured that the public and private sectors profited from the resource. 59 Additionally, Gaddafi's Third Universal Theory (TUT) which was developed in the early years 60 This in turn meant that there was a ban on political parties in Libya. 61 As the resulting public institutions would be run by and answerable to the people, 62 thus, any grievances could be expressed through the respective committees and channeled up from the local level into the municipal and national level committees. 63 However, the oil and banking industries (and foreign policy making decisions), were the 11 exception to this revolutionary overhaul as Gaddafi maintained control over these spheres. 64 This was maintained under Gaddafi until the détente era where a series of economic and public reforms 65 Niger UTA (a French company) flight bombings, for which the country accepted responsibility. 74 However, despite Libya accepting responsibility for these bombings, Europe provided limited support for the US sanctions and 'especially for the use of military force'. 75 This support for international terrorism did however result in the 1993 United Nations (UN) sanction freezing financial transactions with Libya, 76 which was then suspended under the 1998 UN resolution 1192 following the handover and trial of the two Lockerbie suspects. 77 These factors, namely: the sense of statelessness, the rejection of outside influence, the importance of (in terms of wealth) and geographical location of energy reserves, the Further, the ILSA was introduced in 1996 by the US Senate to force Libya to drop:
Its support of international terrorism and its efforts to acquire WMD [as they] constitute a threat to international peace and security that endangers the national security and foreign policy interests of the US and those countries with which it shares common strategic and foreign policy objectives. 80 In 1996, the EU staunchly protested against the extraterritorial nature of the ILSA, 81 something the UN also officially opposed. 82 The EU also identified the ILSA as unproductive and a barrier to increased dialogue. 83 In November 1996, the EU took a step further and implemented a blocking statute on the ILSA (as well as other US laws), which ultimately led to the 1997 EU-US agreement to allow the EU to continue to invest in Libya (and Iran) . 84 This demonstrated the EU's commitment to the peace-through-trade-policy in Libya.
Furthermore, the handover and trial of the Lockerbie suspects led to the 1998 suspension of the UN sanctions. In turn, this led to an era of increased pressure on the US to lift its own sanctions on Libya i.e. the ILSA. Indeed, post-1998 EU firms actively sought to fill the gap in the Libyan market left by the US as a result of the ILSA, particularly when concerned with hydrocarbons (given their high quality and proximity to Europe). 85 Further, Gaddafi This confidence was demonstrated when Libya agreed to repay $36 million worth of debt (roughly 80% of the total owed) to the UK's Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) in January 2004, which then led the UK institution to resume their remit of providing cover for firms wishing to invest in the country (having been on pause since 1984). 89 Each of these examples demonstrated how the international community and specifically, Europeans warmed to Libya following the suspension of its WMD program. Furthermore, the numerous economic transactions also demonstrated the EU's confidence in the peacethrough-trade-policy. This was complemented by the fact that the ENP and EUROMED were implemented in this timeframe. However, as mentioned earlier, Libya was not fully integrated into these two instruments which ran alongside the EU peace-through-trade provisions. The result of each of these developments was a failure of the EU's peace-through-trade-policy in this timeframe.
Attempts at Reform
The economic reforms which swept the country in the 2003-10 period demonstrated Libya's attempts to entice foreign investment after years of being an international community outlier.
Indeed, prior to the end of the WMD program, Gaddafi continued to ring fence the oil sector by denoting that the industry 'can assign any foreign expert to run these [oil] companies in a way to guarantee the promotion of the oil industry', 115 this was something which caused concern to foreign investors. 116 Upon his arrival, the new PM Shukri Ghanem, appointed in June 2003 with the task of reforming the economy, noted that the administration had 'already been working to open up a number of areas in the hydrocarbons sector'. 117 Ghanem's administration also unified the Libyan Dinar currency exchange rate, combining the 16 commercial rate for foreign currency use and an official rate for national use. 118 Additionally, Ghanem noted that a new law was introduced to ensure that 'foreign firms will be obliged to employ more Libyans than foreigners and to re-evaluate salaries for all employees'. 119 Concurrently, Saif also emphasized the need to integrate the country into the international community by announcing in October 2004 that 'there is a new beginning between Libya and the West. Now we are talking about reforms and modernization, but we have to understand the goals, aims and timing, otherwise we will repeat the mistakes of others'. 120 Saif also noted in 2007 that 'the next challenge for Libya is to draft a package of laws which you can call a constitution, but they must be endorsed by the people to become a contract between the people'. 121 Each of these examples demonstrated the need and desire to include Libyans in the political structure of the country by updating the TUT. This impetus also complemented the EU's peace-through-trade-policy.
Despite these calls for reform, the impotence of these schemes were heavily criticized. An This also coincided with the launch of the country's first Private Equity fund by a US firm in January 2007, 125 as well as an economic reform package which saw local entrepreneurs being offered similar incentives to those of foreign investors coming into place. 126 However, despite these positive signs of reform and the liberalizing of the economy which complemented the EU's peace-through-trade-policy agenda (in the sense that more trade was able to be carried out), since the start of 2006, the Libyan government had shut down the overseas arms of the energy sector's state-controlled procurement process. This meant that international companies dealing with transactions in the Hydrocarbons sector had to deal directly with the NOC, which as noted by St John resulted in 'a process which lacked transparency and often delayed agreement'. 127 Gaddafi's July 2010 aim to stick to the post-recession budget which was set to transform the country into 'an economic powerhouse by 2020,' by providing $500 billion for new projects in Libya, 128 showed positive signs for the economic health of the country. However, politically at this point, EU-Libyan ties were strained following Gaddafi's rule to stop issuing entry visas to citizens from the 22 EU Schengen area countries, in a reaction to the Swiss vote to ban the building of minarets in Switzerland. 129 Protests had been taking place in Libya throughout this period and were typified by the an arms, asset and travel ban on members of the administration (including Gaddafi and Saif). 130 The implementation of this led to private investor contractors withdrawing from Libya. 131 On 17 March, the military intervention, under UN resolution 1973, 132 had a significant impact on trade in the country. Indeed, the intervention (along with the underlying sense of statelessness) raised the prospect of a divided Libya. The potential of such a division, which had led to the dwindling of oil production in the country following the sanctions being put in place, led Peter Manoogian, the former BP head in the country, to note:
The oil is mainly on the eastern side, so if the rebels get that that's one thing. But it's hard to see how that could be sustained. Some countries would be in a very difficult position, especially Italy, where the export pipelines go. It would have to recognize the East, as well as the West. 133 Furthermore, the US and EU blacklisting of companies in Libya meant that business tailed off during the conflict. 134 The sanctions and damage accrued to the oil sector by the fighting effectively shut down Libya's oil sector which made up around 70% of revenues in July 2011.
This was a result of the developments in the same month which saw rebels holding Benghazi (east of the Sirte oil fields) and the transport network along which the export and refinery hubs were located was also being held by the rebels in the east. 135 By the end of 2011, oil production was reported at effectively zero, 136 down from 1.80 mbpd in 2010. 137 In the aftermath of the capture and killing Gaddafi, contractors found it difficult to resume work in the country as the legal basis for their contracts were being checked meticulously by the National Transitional Council (NTC), 138 September to December 2011. 140 
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The conflict and ensuing sanctions in Libya also provided a barrier to the success of the EU's peace-through-trade-policy. Indeed, each of these developments underlined the nature of the Libyan state which was lacking a conventional structure under Gaddafi, and as identified by Brahimi, initially it was the NTC's task to ensure its legitimacy in Libya by tackling these issues. 141 A tall order for what was the newly formed acting Libyan government. From the EU perspective, it was clear that the EU member states' public and private commercial interests outweighed the peace-through-trade political goals. It is therefore necessary for the EU to ensure that it takes into account the political and economic environment in which it implements the peace-through-trade-policy. As a result, the EU has two options which are interrelated; firstly, to adopt a policy which concentrates on state building and increasing interactions between the different facets of Libya's society. This would require the EU attaching conditions to its trade deals with Libya, i.e. to allow a presence and active EU role in the county, which would lead to a better understanding of the 142 Brussels has the leverage to apply this policy and in doing so would be executing its peace-through-trade-policy in its truest sense.
Conclusions
Additionally, following the 2010-11 initiated revolutionary wave across the Middle East and the subsequent unrest, it is more important than ever that the EU's peace-through-tradepolicy takes into account the context in which it is being implemented. Indeed, it is only when a nuanced understanding of the different countries and contexts is accounted for in the EU's dealings with the region, that the underlying causes and drivers of conflict and barriers to peace can be understood and broken down, respectively.
Finally, even if the EU members were more united in their adoption of the peace-throughtrade-policy, unless these factors were understood and accounted for, the policy would still face the same issues. Moreover, a recalibration of the peace-through-trade-policy is required for the EU to be successful in the future, either that, or a removal of the peace-throughtrade-policy and rhetoric all together. 
